Quota enforcement in resource industries: self-reporting and differentiated inspections

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Standard

Quota enforcement in resource industries : self-reporting and differentiated inspections. / Hansen, Lars Gårn; Jensen, Frank; Nøstbakken, Linda.

I: Environmental and Resource Economics, Bind 58, Nr. 4, 2014, s. 539-562.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Hansen, LG, Jensen, F & Nøstbakken, L 2014, 'Quota enforcement in resource industries: self-reporting and differentiated inspections', Environmental and Resource Economics, bind 58, nr. 4, s. 539-562. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0

APA

Hansen, L. G., Jensen, F., & Nøstbakken, L. (2014). Quota enforcement in resource industries: self-reporting and differentiated inspections. Environmental and Resource Economics, 58(4), 539-562. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0

Vancouver

Hansen LG, Jensen F, Nøstbakken L. Quota enforcement in resource industries: self-reporting and differentiated inspections. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2014;58(4):539-562. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0

Author

Hansen, Lars Gårn ; Jensen, Frank ; Nøstbakken, Linda. / Quota enforcement in resource industries : self-reporting and differentiated inspections. I: Environmental and Resource Economics. 2014 ; Bind 58, Nr. 4. s. 539-562.

Bibtex

@article{070e0ec3f1214eff97fe15b71e154691,
title = "Quota enforcement in resource industries: self-reporting and differentiated inspections",
abstract = "Quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions. However, in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non-compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget. We propose a new enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history. We use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self-report excess extraction. This system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement, while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction. In addition, inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare.",
author = "Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn} and Frank Jensen and Linda N{\o}stbakken",
note = "Published online 4 August 2013",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0",
language = "English",
volume = "58",
pages = "539--562",
journal = "Environmental and Resource Economics",
issn = "0924-6460",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Quota enforcement in resource industries

T2 - self-reporting and differentiated inspections

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Nøstbakken, Linda

N1 - Published online 4 August 2013

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions. However, in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non-compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget. We propose a new enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history. We use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self-report excess extraction. This system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement, while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction. In addition, inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare.

AB - Quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions. However, in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non-compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget. We propose a new enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history. We use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self-report excess extraction. This system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement, while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction. In addition, inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare.

U2 - 10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0

DO - 10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 58

SP - 539

EP - 562

JO - Environmental and Resource Economics

JF - Environmental and Resource Economics

SN - 0924-6460

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 99926873