Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching

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Standard

Compromises and Rewards : stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching. / Gudmundsson, Jens.

I: International Journal of Game Theory, Bind 48, Nr. 2, 2019, s. 365-392.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Gudmundsson, J 2019, 'Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching', International Journal of Game Theory, bind 48, nr. 2, s. 365-392. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1

APA

Gudmundsson, J. (2019). Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 365-392. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1

Vancouver

Gudmundsson J. Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching. International Journal of Game Theory. 2019;48(2):365-392. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1

Author

Gudmundsson, Jens. / Compromises and Rewards : stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching. I: International Journal of Game Theory. 2019 ; Bind 48, Nr. 2. s. 365-392.

Bibtex

@article{7373989287ee4b0fad7c14e691522b2b,
title = "Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching",
abstract = "Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance. We then derive complementary negative results that show that increasing differences essentially is a necessary condition for the properties to be compatible.",
keywords = "Compromises, Lottery, Non-manipulability, Rewards, Stability, Two-sided matching",
author = "Jens Gudmundsson",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "365--392",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Compromises and Rewards

T2 - stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching

AU - Gudmundsson, Jens

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance. We then derive complementary negative results that show that increasing differences essentially is a necessary condition for the properties to be compatible.

AB - Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance. We then derive complementary negative results that show that increasing differences essentially is a necessary condition for the properties to be compatible.

KW - Compromises

KW - Lottery

KW - Non-manipulability

KW - Rewards

KW - Stability

KW - Two-sided matching

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1

DO - 10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85046809563

VL - 48

SP - 365

EP - 392

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 241093830